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NEGLIGENCE JURY Girardot vs. Williams - No.
14189-Decided June 6, 1938-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon.
George F. Dunklee, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Parties appeared in reverse order in the trial court, and
are hereinafter referred to as there. Plaintiff, a tenant in defendant's
apartment house, attempting to burn waste paper in an ashpit, received
burns about the face, hands, and arms. Charging this to defendant's
negligence, she brought action for $3,000 damages. A jury awarded
her $500.
HELD:
1. Defendants are chargeable only with reasonable care
and are held only to such knowledge as they actually possessed, or such
as reasonable persons, from known conditions, should have possessed.
2. Where facts are not in dispute and absence of negligence is unquestionable, there is nothing to go to a jury. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Bouck, Mr. Justice Young, and Mr. Justice Knous concur.
EVIDENCE -

The Independent Lumber Company vs. Leatherwood-No. 14198Decided June 6, 1938-District Court of Mesa County-Hon.
Straud M. Logan, Judge.
On rehearing, the original opinion, which was previously digested
and published, affirming the judgment, is adhered to.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TAXATION-LEVY OF GENERAL TAX
TO PAY SPECIAL IMPROVEMENT BONDS-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Montgomery vs. City and

County of Denver, et al.-No. 14324-Decided May 31, 1938DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon.Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Modified and affirmed.
FACTS: On December 13, 1937, two ordinances of City and
County of Denver were passed and approved, respectively, levying on
all taxable property within the city a general tax of 1.409 mills on the
dollar, upon the total assessed valuation for the year 1937, and appropriating the proceeds of said levy, amounting to $450,528.52, for the
purpose of paying and redeeming special improvement district bonds
falling due during the year 1938 and interest thereon, which had heretofore been issued in the name of the city to pay for the construction and
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installation of improvements in numerous special improvement districts
within the City of Denver and for which redemption sufficient funds
would not otherwise be available, although by their terms such bonds
and the interest thereon were to be paid by assessments on the specially
benefited property in the various districts. Plaintiff in error, who had
paid the first half of the tax under protest, as a taxpayer, instituted this
action to secure a declaratory judgment that such general tax be held
invalid on constitutional grounds and because in conflict with certain
charter provisions, and sought refund for himself, and those similarly
situated, of taxes paid and to be paid under said levy.
HELD: 1. The Supreme Court will not decide questions "which
have not yet arisen and which may never arise"; nor will it reply to mere
'speculative inquiries."
2. The appellate court will not determine the validity of certain
proposed refunding bonds with reference to which no ordinance has been
adopted or even introduced.
3. It is without the purview of the Declaratory Judgment Act to
determine the status of possible refunds to taxpayers of taxes paid in
previous years and under different ordinances than those here involved
and to announce the legal effect of the payment of such taxes under protest without the presence of any of the taxpayers as parties to this proceeding.
4. The Denver City Council, at least in the case of special improvement bonds not guaranteed, except where 80% of said improvement district bonds have already been paid, has no general authority as
a matter of public welfare, or otherwise, to levy a general tax to pay
defaulted portions of special improvement district bonds, and, therefore,
in so far as the levy under consideration is devoted to the payment of
such bonds or interest thereon in districts which have not discharged
80% of their outstanding bonds, it was unauthorized.
5. Special improvement bonds, although not a debt of the municipality in the constitutional sense of the word, nor an obligation which
is payable from general funds, if issued in the name of the municipality,
to be paid only from a special fund created by the enabling act and so
limited on the face of the obligation, are bonds of the municipality.
6. The City Charter provision, providing that whenever a public
improvement district has paid out and cancelled four-fifths of its outstanding bonds and there is insufficient money in the surplus or deficiency
fund to pay the remaining bonds, the city shall pay such bonds when
due and reimburse itself by collecting the unpaid assessments due the
district, is constitutional.
7. " 'The idea of a "debt" in the constitutional sense is that an
obligation has arisen out of contract, express or implied, which entitles
the creditor unconditionally to receive from the debtor a sum of money,
which the debtor is under a legal, equitable, or moral duty to pay without regard to any future contingency.' "
8. The charter provision does not create a debt within the mean-
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ing of that word as used in Section 8, Article XI of the Constitution.
EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Bakke concur. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck, and Mr.
Justice Holland concur in part and dissent in part. Mr. Justice Young
specially concurs in part and dissents in part.

CREDITOR'S BILL IN EQUITY TO SET ASIDE CONVEYANCES BY BANKRUPT--STATUTE OF L.IMITATIONS-FRAUD--Bowman, etc. vs.
May et al.-No. 14199-Decided May 31,1938-DistrictCourt
of Denver-Hon. James C. Starkweather, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action by trustee in bankruptcy in nature of creditor's
bill to set aside conveyances of property by bankrupt to his mother-inlaw and wife. Trial court entered judgment in favor of grantees.
HELD:
1. Supreme Court will not disturb judgment of trial
court based upon conflicting evidence as to consideration passing for
conveyance of real and personal property to relatives of bankrupt, prior
to bankruptcy.
2. Where judgment is obtained against bankrupt in 1929, but
execution is not issued until 1934, upon the return of which creditor
learned of alleged fraudulent conveyances, and nothing appears to explain the reason for the five year delay intervening between the entry of
judgment and the issuance of the execution, the three year statute of limitations applies.
3. " 'Courts of equity will not interfere if a party slumbers on
his rights or the means of detecting the fraud.' "
4. Full possession of the means of detecting a fraud is equivalent
to knowledge. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur.

WILLS-U. S. GOVERNMENT BONDS-PAYEE THEREOF-EVIDENCE
-CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-In re Stanley, Deceased. Meyer vs.
Mercier-No. 14253-Decided May 31, 1938-DistrictCourt of
Las Animas County-Hon. David M. Ralston, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: S left will providing that all of her property in her possession at time of her death should be divided equally among Meyer, Decker
and Mercier. At the time of her death, U. S. Government baby bonds,
payable to S or Mercier were found in her safety deposit box. Mercier
claims ownership and Meyer claims that the bonds should be sold and
divided amorig the three legatees.
HELD: 1. Where the U. S. Government baby bonds specifically
incorporate therein by reference regulations of the treasury department
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as to whom the bonds may be made payable, such regulations are admissible in evidence.
2. Section 4 of the enabling act to the State Constitution says the
members of the convention shall declare " 'that they adopt the Constitution of the United States' "; Section 2 of Article VI of the Federal
Constitution says, " 'This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, * * * shall be the
supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby; * * *'"
3. Under the Federal laws and regulations, the bonds become the
property of Mercier upon the death of S, and need not be divided among
the legatees. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur.

PETITIONS FOR INITIATED MEASURES-INTERVENTION BY CITIZENS
-Brownlow, et al. vs. Wunch, et al.-No. 14330-Decided May
31, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon. Geo. F. Dunklee,
Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. If the Secretary of State refuses to.file or refile a tendered petition to initiate a measure and mandamus is brought to compel
him to do so, a citizen who feels that he will be injured by the proposed amendment does not have such an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties to the action to enable him
to intervene.
2. The filing of such a petition is a ministerial act. The Secretary
of State may in his discretion determine whether there has been a compliance with the necessary legal prerequisites to entitle the petition to be
filed. If he determines that there has been, he may file it. If he determines that there has not, he may refuse, as he did in this case. No persons other than the Secretary of State and proponents have any interest
in the controversy.
2. "The judgment in a mandamus suit may be, that a ministerial
officer-where there is a clear legal duty--shall perform, or, where the
duty does not appear, that he need not perform; but never that he shall
not perform." EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Burke dissents.
Mr. Justice Holland not participating.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT--SERVICE TAX
-Rinn vs. Bedford, etc.-No. 14275-DecidedMay 31, 1938District Court of Boulder County-Hon. Claude C. Coffin, Judge
-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. Before an act will be held unconstitutional under the
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procedure of the Declaratory Judgment Act, it is necessary to show the
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. "No person is entitled to assail the constitutionality of a statute
except as he himself is adversely affected."
3. "The attack must be restricted to such matters as are necessarily
involved in the particular case."
4. The courts have nothing to do with that part of an argument
which partakes of the nature of discussion as to whether the policy represented by the Act is good or bad.
5. The court finds no uncertainty in that part of the Service Tax
Act which the plaintiff has a right to question; and, therefore, the Act
will not be held to be unconstitutional for uncertainty.
6. Plaintiff may not concern himself about the exaction of the tax
on services rendered to or for him by others. He may take the service as
offered or leave it.
7. There is no distinction in principle between causing an attorney
to collect the tax on his services and remit it to the State, and causing a
gasoline dispenser to collect and remit the gasoline tax. That one is a
service tax and the other a sales tax makes no difference.
8. The title of the Act, "an act providing for additional public
revenue," does not contravene Section 21, Article V of the Colorado
Constitution. The matter of providing in detail the process of collecting
the additional revenue is clearly included within, and germane to, the
connotation of the general title.
9. "The exemptions are apparently based upon legitimate legislative classification of which the plaintiff cannot complain."
10. The allegations of the complaint do not entitle plaintiff to
raise an issue as to whether the Act unlawfully makes him personally
liable for payment of the tax by those he serves, or as to whether the Act
is in controvention of Section 12 in Article II of the Colorado court
which prohibits imprisonment for debt. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Holland dissent.
CRIMINAL LAW-RAPE-INDECENT LIBERTIES-PRESUMPTION IN
FAVOR OF JUDGMENT-FORMER JEOPARDY-Lambert vs. People

-No. 14328-DecidedMay 23, 1938-DistrictCourt of Denver
-Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:

Plaintiff charged on first count with statutory rape, and

on second count with taking indecent liberties with same girl on same
day. He pleaded guilty to the second count and was tried and found
guilty of the first. He was sentenced to a term of from 9 to 10 years on
the second count and 20 to 25 years on the first, sentences to run concurrently. Defendant contends that his plea of guilty and sentence thereon
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amounted to former jeopardy and that he could not be tried on the statutory rape count.
1. Where it is moved by the District Attorney, with the
HELD:
consent of the defendant, that the evidence on the rape case be considered
by the court as the evidence to guide it in fixing the punishment in the
other and where the evidence is not before the appellate court, it will
assume that the evidence established both offenses under the rule that all
presumptions are in favor of the judgment.
* * Since the sentences were imposed at the same time and
2. "*
run concurrently, defendant is not injured unless it be assumed that by
his plea to the second count, at a time when court and counsel could not
know what the evidence would develop, he had a right to thus trick them
into a position forestalling prosecution for a serious offense by a plea of
The law is against
guilty to one of lesser grade, and that he did so."
such juggling. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Young, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Knous concur.

INFLUENCE -EVIDENCE
WILLS-CONTEST-ARGUMENT -UNDUE
re Estate of Rentfro. Allen et al. vs. Rent-INSTRUCTIONS-In
fro-No. 14192-Decided May 23, 1938-District Court of
Alamosa County-Hon. John I. Palmer, Judge-Reversed.
HELD: 1. Where, in a will contest, the contention is made that
the will was not legally attested, and no argument is made on the point,
it is considered as having been waived.
2. Where it appears that the testator was of clear mind, recognized
people in the room, had been given some drugs prior to signing the will,
that the doctors testified that he was not mentally incapacitated, that the
will was made in accordance with a notation he had had prepared some
days previously, except that in the will he left a bequest to a daughter
by a former marriage, there is not sufficient testimony upon which to
hold that the testator was mentally incapacitated.
3. Evidence reviewed and found not to sustain contention that
chief beneficiary used undue influence.
4. Mere kindness of treatment, or reasonable solicitation, entreaty
or persuasion, and without restraint, would not be sufficient to vitiate a
will.
5. Instructions reviewed and found to properly state the law. IN
DEPARTMENT.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
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WILLS-TESTIMONY-EVIDENCE-COMPROMISE-ATTESTING WITNESSES-Ainsworth us. Ainsworth, et al.-No. 14081-Decided
May 23, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon. Frank McDonough, Sr., Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Contest between two brothers over their mother's will,
plaintiff in error, Robert, being the contestant, and the proponent is
Alfred, defendant in error.
HELD:
1. Testimony as to undue influence, covering a period of
approximately three years is admissible; but, transactions occurring as
long as 25 years prior to the making of a will are not admissible.
2. An offer of compromise occurring after the contents of the will
were disclosed is not admissible in evidence.
3. The fact that two employees of the testatrix, who were attesting witnesses, would get a bonus together with other employees, because
of the cancellation of an $8,000 mortgage debt owing the testatrix by
the corporation did not make them have a "present, certain and vested"
interest as would disqualify them as witnesses, and thus void the will,
which would result because of insufficient attestation. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
WITNESSES-ATTORNEY TESTIFYING-MINORS-Lee vs. LeiboldNo. 14306-Decided May 23, 1938-DistrictCourt of DenverHon. Joseph J. Walsh, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: 1. Where an attorney is engaged by the "next friend" of
an infant to prosecute a claim against an estate in behalf of the infant,
on a contingent basis to be paid from the anticipated proceeds, he is not
directly interested in the event of the proceedings within the contemplation of the statute so as to disqualify him from testifying on behalf of
the infant claimant. This is so because of the general rule that, "It is
evidently a necessary incident to the duty of conducting a suit or maintaining a defense for an infant that the next friend or guardian ad litem
should have the power of selecting and employing counsel. But he has
no power to bind the infant or his-estate by a contract as to the compensation to be paid." EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck not participating. Mr. Justice Holland dissenting.
NEGLIGENCE-AUTOMOBILES--STATUTES

AND RULES OF ROAD--

Parrish vs. Smith-No. 14195-Decided April 11, 1938-District Court of Teller County-Hon. John M.

Meikie, Judge-

Reversed.
FACTS: S obtained judgment against P for damages for personal
injuries sustained by him resulting from a collision between an automo-
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bile in which he was riding and P's truck. At the place of collision, a
new highway was in course of construction, at some places crossing the
old road and at others following its course. The vehicles collided at one
end of a cut through which all travel had to pass. All of the surface of
the highway within the cut was broken up and had obstructions upon it.
It permitted one way traffic which had made deep tracks. P's truck was
just about to emerge from the one way passage when the collision occurred. The condition of the road and the presence of the vehicles were
known to all parties. Lower court refused to sustain motion for nonsuit.
HELD: 1. The trial court should have sustained the motion for
non-suit, for the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver of
the car in which plaintiff was riding.
2. The statute providing that all vehicles on state highways shall
pass each other to the right is not applicable to the case, in view of the
surrounding circumstances, in that the accident did not happen on a
traveled or defined roadway.
3. Statutes and rules of road are designed to govern traffic upon
highways that are prepared for use as such; and are applicable only to
permanent lines of travel.
4. It was error for the court to give an instruction requiring the
defendant to give half of the cut to the plaintiff, under the conditions of
the road.
5. Where the accident resulting in injury to the passenger is caused
by the driver of his car, and no negligence on the part of the operator of
the other vehicle exists, the passenger may not recover from the owner of
the second vehicle.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice
Young and Mr. Justice Knous dissent.

WATER-RATE BASE - OWNERSHIP MINIMUM OPERATING AND
MAINTENANCE EXPENSE-The Board of Water Commissioners

of Jefferson County, et al. vs. The Rocky Mountain Water Company-No. 14125-Decided April 4, 1938-District Court of
Jefferson County-Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: The judgment of the District Court, which the board
seeks to reverse, enjoined as unreasonable and confiscatory the enforcement of a rate of $2.50 an inch, fixed by the board under section 143,
chapter 90, C. S. A. 1935, as the carrying charge for water conveyed by
the company through its ditch to a large number of consumers.
The principal contentions between the parties is whether or not the
whole or any part of the value of the water rights involved should be
included in the rate base, and whether or not the court was in error in
failing to find the reasonable annual minimum operating expenses and
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maintenance charges which, together with 6% return on the rate base,
must be produced in order to prevent confiscation.
HELD:
1. The ownership of water remains in the public, with
a perpetual right to its use, free of charge, in the people. A carrier does
not become a proprietor of the water diverted.
2. The carrier's diversion from the natural stream must unite with
the consumer's use in order that there may be a complete appropriation
within the meaning of our fundamental law.
3. The value of the water and appropriation under which it is
carried is not a proper component of the rate base for a ditch company.
4. In the view the court has taken of what properly constitutes the
rate base, a finding of minimum operating and maintenance expense is
imperative. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.

PLEADINGS-MOTIONS-Zimmerman vs. Hinderlider, State Engineer
et al.-No. 14214-Decided April 4, 1938-District Court of
Larimer County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. In general, as to motions directed to pleadings and
points made or which could have been made thereby, the holding is that
the filing of demurrers or answers operates as a waiver thereof. To this
general rule an exception seems to exist as to motions urged in the interest of separation of causes, and this only is so where the motion to require
separation was timely, but was wrongly denied. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
MINING LAw-LODE CLAIM-PLACER CLAIM-PROCEDURE-LAND
DEPARTMENT-HOMESTEADS-McMullin, et al. vs. Magnuson
-No.
14005-Decided April 4, 1938-District Court of Fremont County-Hon. James L. Cooper, Judge--Correctedand affirmed.
FACTS: On March 1, 1928, the "Mica Lode" was located as a
lode mining claim by the predecessors in interest of Colorado Feldspar
Company, one of the defendants in error and the now lode claimant.
The "Mica Hill Placer No. 1" containing 160 acres covering the
Mica Lode and all other claims mentioned, was filed as a placer on September 16, 1933, by the plaintiffs in error, who are now the placer
claimants.
After the issues were framed, we find the rival groups of defendants
arrayed to finally litigate on the merits of their respective mineral locations, with the original plaintiffs, the lessees, disinterestedly standing by
awaiting a determination of this issue in order that they might be advised
as to which locator the royalties, accrued and to accrue, should be paid.
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HELD: 1. A placer location cannot be made upon rock in place
bearing valuable mineral. If the mineral substance is not found in veins
of rock in place, the ground would be subject to placer location.
2. The origin or method of formation of a mineral body is not
controlling in determining whether the ground is subject to location as
a lode or placer.
3. When a suit is already pending between the same parties for the
recovery of the ground in conflict at the time of the filing of the adverse
claim, it has been held that such suit may stand as a suit to support the
adverse and no new suit need be brought.
4. The matters presented to review in the appellate court should
be limited to questions submitted to, and passed upon by, the trial tribunal.
5. An adverse suit may be determined by the court without a
jury, if no demand is made for a jury, and silence is deemed to be an
acquiescence in the procedure followed.
6. The question whether a mineral deposit is subject to location
as a lode or placer is not exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Land
Department, and may be adjudicated by a court in determining the right
of possession to the ground in controversy.
7. A controversy over rights of a homesteader must be between the
mineral locator or operator and the homestead entryman or patentee in
such capacities, and can have no bearing on the rights of claimants under
conflicting mineral location. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.

COUNTY COURT-DISMISSAL OF APPEAL FROM JUSTICE COURT-

The Poudre River Oil Corporation vs. Flake-No. 14213-Decided April 4, 1938--County Court of Larimer County-Hon.
Albert P. Fischer, Judge-Reversed.

Flake recovered a money judgment before the Justice
FACTS:
of the Peace against the plaintiff in error which duly perfected an appeal to the County Court. Thereafter, the case was repeatedly set for
trial in the County Court, but each setting was vacated for one reason
or another. Finally, a hearing was had on Flake's motion to dismiss
the appeal, and on the corporation's motion to dismiss the case itself.
The Court refused to dismiss the case, but dismissed the appeal.
1. When once the case was properly lodged in the
HELD:
County Court, the appeal could not be summarily dismissed. When
a case is effectually appealed from a Justice Court, it must thereafter

be dealt with as is any other case pending in the County Court.
BANC.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.

EN
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LEGISLATION-GENERAL - COUNTY TREASURER-SALARY-CHANGE
AFTER ELECTION-Young vs. Board of County Commissioners

of Park County, et. at-No. 14114-Decided March 28, 1938District Court of Park County-Hon. James L. Cooper, JudgeAffirmed.
FACTS: Young is County Treasurer and Ex-officio Public Trustee of Park County. As the latter officer, he earned approximately
$125.00 in fees, to which he maintains his right as compensation.
The question is whether he, as public trustee, or the county is entitled to the fees.
HELD:
1. An act which makes a reasonable classification of
counties, and is equally applicable to all counties of a given class is
general legislation and not special.
2. An act, passed in 1933, and which "shall be effective on and
after January 15, 1935," providing that the public trustee of the county
should receive no compensation beyond what he drew as county treasurer was notice to Young, who took office November 6, 1934, that
it was the law in Colorado on and after January 15, 1935, and hence,
was not a diminution of his salary or emoluments "after his election."
EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Bouck concurs in the result. Mr. Justice Knous not participating.

AGENCY -

CONTRACTS -

OPTIONS -

COMMITTEES-FAILURE

TO

PERFORM AS CONTRACTED-Amidon, et al. vs. Bettex-No.

14161--Decided April 4, 1938-DistrictCourt of Yuma County
-Hon. Arlington Taylor, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action by Bettex, the plaintiff, for recovery of real
estate broker's commission claimed to be due him from defendants.
Defendants comprised-a bond holders committee representing the holders of $12,900 of an $18,000 bond issue against a ranch. On June 6,
1934, the committee had commenced foreclosure proceedings under the
terms of the mortgage, and on that day gave to plaintiff an option to
sell the ranch for $9,000 cash, and instrument also reciting that committee was to be bound as such and not as individuals. Plaintiff got
a purchaser for $8,500. The committee contracted to sell to him, and
$2,500 was placed in escrow in a bank. The foreclosure was completed, but neither the committee nor the purchaser bid at the foreclosure sale, and the certificate of purchase was acquired by another
party. Plaintiff made claim to the committee for his commission and
upon refusal brought this action against the members as individuals.
HELD:
1. The contract to sell constituted an entirely new and
independent agreement and was wholly independent of the option relied upon by the defendants.
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If an agent exceeds his authority, by reason of which his
2.
principal is not bound by his actions, the agent becomes liable for any
damage thereby occasioned to the other party to a contract.
If the committee was authorized by the note holders to enter
3.
into the subsequent ngotiations which provided for the payment of a
commission, and further, for certain conditions to be performed by
the committee, then when the committee failed to perform its undeniable part of the contract to the damage of plaintiff, the members
IN DEPARTMENT.
thereof become liable individually.
Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bakke concur.

vs. The Empire
TRADE FIXTURES--MILLS-CONTRACT-Webb
Chief Mining Company-No. 14104-Decided April 4, 1938-

District Court of Hinsdale County-Hon. Straud M. Logan,
Judge-Affirmed.
Action to determine ownership of a mill erected by
FACTS:
plaintiff in error on certain mining properties belonging to the defendant in error.
1. The case law pertaining to trade fixtures, as beHELD:
tween landlord and tenant, is not so substantial as to prevail over positive provisions of a lease regarding said fixtures. IN DEPARTMENT.
Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur.

WILLS-RULE OF CY PRES-INTENT OF TESTATOR-Fisher, et al.
vs. Minshall, et al.-No. 14053-DecidedMarch 21, 1938-District Court of Adams County-Hon. Samuel W. Johnson, Judge

-Reversed.
1. Although to a certain extent, 43rd Elizabeth Chap.
HELD:
4, doctrine of cy pres, is a part of the law of Colorado, its details and
remedies are not. Nevertheless, under their ordinary equity powers,
the Courts of Colorado may make such modifications and alterations in
charitable bequsts, otherwise impossible of exact execution, as are consistent with the testator's intent.
The controlling element in the interpretation of wills is the
2.
intent of the testator, and that intent must be "manifest from the inIN DEPARTMENT.
strument itself."

Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Bakke, concur.
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LEASES-TERMINATION OF BY NOTICE-TENANCY BY SUFFERANCE

-RENT-Barlow and The National Oil Corporation vs. Hoffman, et al.-No. 14049-Decided March 21, 1938-District
Court of Denver-Hon. Frank McDonough, Sr., Judge-Reversed
in part.
HELD:
1. Where a lease has been terminated by the lessor's
notice, the tenancy from then on is a mere tenancy by sufferance or at
will with an obligation to pay, not the rent provided by the lease, but
whatever the use of the premises is reasonably worth. IN DEPARTMENT.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Knous concur.
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION-PERMITS-RIGHT

TO CLARIFY-

The Public Utilities Commission of Colorado, and Bennie Goldstein vs. Weicker TransportationCompany, et al.-No. 14278Decided March 21, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon. Otto

Bock, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. The Public Utilities Commission is clothed with
general powers to regulate and control carriers for hire within the state,
and Courts will not interfere with its administrative rulings when they
are just and reasonable; procedure before it should not be tested by
the technical rules of pleading.
2. The Commission has the authority to clarify a permit to
transport freight for hire issued to a private carrier, so-as to include intermediate points on his route, when such intermediate points were not

mentioned in his application or permit.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.

EN BANC.

CRIMINAL LAW-SETTLEMENTS AS AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY

-Hammons vs. The People of the State of Colorado-No. 14290
-Decided March 14, 1938-District Court of Las Animas
County-Hon. David M. Ralston, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
Plaintiff in error is hereinafter referred to as defendant.
On a verdict of guilty of the larceny of $250.00, he was sentenced to
the state reformatory. The sole question is whether the verdict is
supported by the evidence.
HELD:
1. Victims of larceny are not obliged to make a complaint.
2. The settlement by the victim with the culprit, by taking from
him an acknowledgment of the amount, graciously dubbed "borrowed,"
is no defense to his criminal liability. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.
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ELECTIONS-TIE ELECTION-DESTRUCTION OF BALLOTS-Gallegos

us. Waybrant-No. 14236-Decided March 21, 1938--County
Court of Costilla County-Hon. Jose Carpio Valdez, JudgeAffirmed.
FACTS:
The judgment sought to be reversed was rendered in an
election contest involving the office of Secretary for the School Board
of the Fort Garland School district. The contestant is Waybrant, a
voter; the contestee is Gallegos, who, as one of the three candidates
for the office, received a certificate of election.
Gallegos, Parsons and Maes, the candidates, were credited with
100, 98 and 58 votes, respectively.
The Trial Court entered judgment ordering a new election upon
hearing evidence that within twenty minutes after the counting of the
ballots and over the protests of the two acting judges of the election,
the ballot box, together with the ballots therein, the poll books, the
certificate of return, and the registration list of voters were, at the
instance of divers persons present, taken, burned and wholly destroyed;
and that the certificate of election made in favor of Gallegos was based
wholly upon hearsay testimony and evidence.
HELD:
1. The affidavits of two persons stating that they were
not qualified to vote and had voted for Gallegos made the election a
tie at 98 for Gallegos and 98 for Parsons, and the County Court was
justified in ordering a new election. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Knous concur.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEPENDENCY-WHAT

CONSTITUTES

-PRESUMPTIONS-The
Empire Zinc Company vs. Industrial
Commission of Colorado, Elizabeth Holden, minor sister, et al.No. 14220-Decided March 21, 1938-District Court of Eagle
County-Hon. William H. Luby, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
Elizabeth Holden, as claimant, made claim as a dependent to the Industrial Commission, on account of the injury and death

of her brother, John Holden, while in the employ of the Empire Zinc
Company. Her claim was allowed and an award made thereon by the
commission, and upon review was affirmed by the District Court.
HELD:
1. Claimant, being a sister of deceased, there is no presumption of her dependency, and the burden was upon her to establish
such dependency as would bring her within the provisions of the
statute.

2. An anticipation by a dependent of a continuation of the already established status of dependency, without a suggestion of its
termination, is the true guide in determining whether or not she was
in fact a dependent. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, and
Mr. Justice Hilliard dissenting. Mr. Justice Bouck, not participating.
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WITH THE STATUTE-In Re: Estate of Albert S. Livingston, Deceased, Petition for Probate of Will; Edward L. Shaffer, Proponent vs. District Court, Second JudicialDistrict, Division.Two,
Hon. Otto Bock president and Robert Edwin Livingston, Heir
and Legatee-No. 14289-Decided March 21, 1938-District
Court of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action involving the probate of the alleged last Will
and Testament of Albert S. Livingston, deceased. Probate was denied
in the County Court, and on appeal to the District Court, the issue was
tried to a jury, which also found against the proponent. The District
Judge is named as Defendant in error because of alleged usurpation of
conduct of proponent's case at the trial.
The preponderance of the evidence was against the proper execution, publication and declaration of the will.
HELD:
1. The fact that a will is fair on its face does not entitle the proponent to have it admitted to probate, if the proponent
fails in the duty which the law places on him.
2. Court did not err in refusing the proffered testimony of the
principal beneficiary under the will, who was the admitted author of it.
3. "The record as made by the proponents themselves showed
a lack of compliance with the essential provisions of our statute conIN DEPARTMENT.
cerning the execution and attestation of wills."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
CONTRACTS-VOIDANCE OF BY INFANT-REPLEVIN-DEMURRERSTATUS Quo-Mosko, doing business as Denver Motor Finance

Company vs. Forsythe-No. 14292-Decided February 28,
1938--County Court of Arapahoe County-Hon. Henry Bruce
Teller, Judge-Reversed and Remanded.
FACTS: Plaintiff sold an automobile to defendant, who was an
infant, without any knowledge of defendant's infancy. As part payment, defendant gave, and plaintiff accepted a Ford automobile. Defendant executed and delivered to plaintiff his note and chattel mortgage
for the balance of the purchase price. Defendant paid three installments and then rescinded, disaflirmed and repudiated the entire transaction including the note and chattel mortgage and so notified the plaintiff. Defendant claims that he offered to return the automobile delivered to him by plaintiff, if plaintiff would restore to him the Ford
automobile which defendant had traded in, or its value, together with
the three monthly payments made to plaintiff. Plaintiff brought a
replevin suit and defendant answered, and asked the Court to be placed
in status quo. Plaintiff's demurrer to this answer was overruled and

he elected to stand thereon.
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HELD:
1. The relative rights of both parties does not enter
into the question of the right to possession, which is the only question
involved in a replevin action.
2.
When defendant elected to disaffirm and void the contract, it
became invalid ab initio, the parties thereto reverted to the same position as if the contract never had been made, and neither is bound by
any part of the contract when once rescinded.
3.
Upon voidance of the contract by the infant, he then having
in his possession the specific property received by him through the
transaction, he was required to return same to plaintiff as a prerequisite
to such voidance.
4.
The right of the defendant infant to disaffirm and void his
contract is an absolute and paramount right which carries with it the
right to be placed in status quo relative thereto. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bakke concur.

JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS-ESTATES-PREFERRED CLAIMS-SURVIVORSHIP - RES JUDICATA - ESTOPPEL-INTEREST-ISSUES
OF FACT-TRIAL COURT-May Youngquest vs. Bell Youngquest-No. 14283-Decided February 28, 1 938-District Court
of Denver-Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge--Judgment modified
and as modified, affirmed.
FACT:
Plaintiff is the administratrix of the estate of William C.
Youngquest.
At the time of deceased's death, there was a checking
account of $5,800.00, which was carried on the banks records as the
joint account of deceased and defendant.
The County Court, in an
ex parte proceeding, issued an order restraining the bank from paying
out or otherwise disposing of the funds in the mentioned account, until
further order of Court, but upon a petition filed by defendant praying
that the restraining order be dissolved, the County Court fou.nd in
favor of defendant.
Upon appeal, the District Court held with the

administratrix. During the pendency of the proceedings last mentioned, which were based upon the alleged existence of a joint bank
account to which the defendant asserted a right under the doctrine of
survivorship, the defendant filed a claim against the estate for'$1,800.00, alleged to be her private funds which were deposited by her in
the mentioned account, and $3,107.50 for services and $67.50 advanced by defendant to pay taxes for deceased. The County Court denied the claim, except as to the tax payment. Upon appeal, the District Court allowed the item of $1,800.00 as a preferred claim against
the estate and denied the claim for services.
HELD:
I. Issues of fact determined by the trial Court, cannot
be considered by the higher tribunal if the claimant has failed to file a
motion for a new trial or secure an order dispensing therewith.
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2. Res judicata or an estoppel will not apply to the $1,800.00
because the former case was based upon an alleged joint bank account,
and the present case is based upon decedent's bank account.
3. In this case claimant is not entitled to any interest prior to
the time her claim ripened into a judgment.
4. A claim cannot be accorded any preferred status unless it is
filed within six months after the granting of letters of administration.
IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bakke concur.

ALIMONY-ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY TRIAL COURT-Rodgers us.
Rodgers-No. 14216-Decided February 28, 1938-District
Court of Denver-Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge-Reersed and
Remanded.
FACTS: Plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, seeks reversal
of a judgment denying her further alimony as the divorced wife of the
defendant.
1. Awarding alimony and fixing the amount thereof
HELD:
rests in the sound discretion of the trial Court, and, unless it is made
to appear that there has been an abuse of discretion, its judgment will
not be disturbed.
2. A Court rendering a decree of divorce retains jurisdiction to
modify provisions for alimony as changed conditions of the parties
may render necessary and proper. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.

QUIET TITLE-REMOVAL OF CLOUD ON TITLE-LEGAL CLAIMEQUITY-Harrison us. City and County of Denuer-No. 14227
-Decided February 28, 1938-District Court of Grand County
-Hon. Charles E. Herrick, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff, who was one of the defendants in the District
Court, prosecutes a writ of error to reverse a judgment in favor of the
City. The complaint on which judgment was rendered was styled
by the City, "Amended Complaint to remove cloud on title." Plaintiff contends that the complaint does not state a cause of action in that
the City fails to allege that it was in possession of the property at the
time suit was instituted, and this being a quiet title suit, possession is
a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action.
1. The plaintiff is not limited to a quiet title action,
HELD:
but may bring a general equitable suit for the specific purpose of re-
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moving the cloud, in which case there is no requirement by statute that
the plaintiff be in possession.
2. One who owns an undivided three-fourths interest in a
specific tract of real property has a legal claim therein, and is entitled
under the statute to redeem. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Knous concur.
DEDICATION OF ROADS-USER-ENTRY OF LAND--Leach vs. Manhart and Rhodes-No. 14075-Decided February 28, 1938District Court of Douglas County-Hon. John M. Meikle, Judge
-Reversed.
FACTS:
Suit by defendants in error, to enjoin plaintiff in error
from using a road through their properties which had been enjoyed by
the public for over half a century.
Manhart now owns the Gerber
land, but over which the road does not cross, whose entry was made
preceding the establishment of the road.
HELD:
1. The Gerber land is not burdened with the road;
hence, the date of its entry is unimportant and will not extend to Manhart's entire holdings.
2. Statute expressly dedicates a right-of-way for roads over unappropriated government land, acceptance of which by the public results from "use of those for whom it was necessary or convenient."
(R. S., Sec. 2477, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1918, Sec. 4919, Title 43, U. S.
C.A., Sec. 932.)
IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION-BURDEN
OF PROOF-QUESTIONS
OF FACT AND OF LAW-COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-Industrial
Commission of Colorado, et a[. vs. Stebbins-No. 14281-Decided March 7, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon. Otto
Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. Ordinarily, the claimant has the burden of proving
his claim, but where it is admitted that the employee was at work in
the course of his employment shortly preceding the time of his accident, it becomes the duty of the employer to show that the employee

had left it, where employer relies on the defense that the employee was
not acting in the course of his employment at the time of the injury.
2. When the record evidence establishes that the employee was
acting within the scope of his employment at the time of his accident,
no evidence appearing to the contrary, there can properly be no finding
that he was not so acting. In such circumstances, the reviewing court
is passing upon a question of law and not upon the facts. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
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WATERRIGHTS-DOCTRINE OF RELATION-PRIORITIES-NOTICESan Luis Roller Mills vs. San Luis Power and Water CompanyNo. 13909-Decided March 7, 1938-District Court of Costilla
County-Hon. John I. Palmer,Judge-Reversed in part.
FACTS:
The Mill Company claims a priority as of March 1,
1908.
The Water Company claims a priority to the same water as of
July 28, 1908.
Each of the two parties and its predecessor in interest,
failed to file a map and statement with the State Engineer within the
sixty days provided for such filing under the statute then in force.
The
question is whether under the evidence the district court was right in
substituting-as the Mills, Inc., priority date-the date of August 20,
1909, the time when the water was actually diverted.
HELD:
1. The trial Court based its decision solely upon the
view that initiation of the Mills, Inc., claim was futile because lacking
"an open and notorious physical demonstration" sufficient "to
constitute notice to the world."
But notice to the world does not mean
a notice to every inhabitant of the world.
It merely means a notice
reasonably likely to bring knowledge to everyone within the sphere of
possible adverse interest.
EN BANC.

ESTATES-CREDITORS-ALLOWANCES-In re: Estate of Sabin, et al.
vs. Lora Sabin-No. 14191-Decided March 7, 1938--County
Court of Pueblo County-Hon. Hubert Glover, Judge-Afirmed.
FACTS:
Fred A. Sabin died leaving a will that was duly admitted to probate.
The controversy is over a claim presented by the
testator's widow, Zora Sabin, as creditor.
Plaintiffs in error contend
that the County Court erred by allowing the claim and by not deducting
various items alleged to be proper charges against the claimant.
HELD:
I.
Evidence was presented by plaintiffs in error tending to show legitimate charges which would substantially reduce recovery.
However, these matters constituted issues of fact.
It was for
the trial Court to consider all the evidence, and as the lawful fact finding tribunal it came to conclusions by which the Supreme Court is
bound.
IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Knous concur.
WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION-PROCEDURE-JURISDICTION-PETITION FOR REVIEW OF COMMISSION'S FINDINGS-IndustrialCommission of Colorado et al. vs. Martinez-No. 14233-Decided
January 17, 1938-DistrictCourt of Las Animas County-Hon.
John L. East, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
Deceased was employed by a coal company whose compensation insurance was carried by the State Compensation Insurance
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The
Fund. He met his death as the result of compensable accident.
claimants filed with the commission, whose referee found in their favor,
and awarded $2,985.00. On petition for review, the commission itself fixed the same amount. Claimants took the cause to the District
Court where the award was increased to $3,545.00.
HELD:
1. The judgment is reversed because the District Court
never had jurisdiction for "no action, proceeding or suit to set aside,
vacate or amend any finding, order or award of the commission, or
to enjoin the enforcement thereof, shall be brought unless the plaintiff shall have first applied to the commission for a review as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
2. Although the point was not raised below, the Supreme Court
will take cognizance of it since it is jurisdictional.
3. A petition to the commission asking that it review the findings
of the referee is not all that is necessary.
4. The District Court could acquire no jurisdiction over the subject matter unless the fact appeared in the record that the petitioner had
made application to the commission for a rehearing.
5. If the complaint does not allege the filing of a petition for
review provided by Statute, the Court acquires no jurisdiction, and the
point may be raised by demurrer. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Knous and
Mr. Justice Holland concur in the conclusion. Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
OF TAXES
QUIET TITLE-PARTIES-TAXATION-CERTIFICATES
DUE-FAILURE OF TREASURER TO LIST TAX--City and County

of Denver, etc., vs. Highlander Boy Foundation-No. 14232Decided April 11, 1938-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. Robert
W. Steele, Judge-Affrmed.
FACTS: Action to quiet title to certain real estate against the
purported lien of a special improvement tax. The City demurred on
ground of insufficient facts and defect of parties. The lower Court
overruled the demurrers.
HELD:
1. The assumption that the tax imports bondholders
whose securities must be paid from it and that such bondholders were
necessary parties, is unsupported, and if otherwise, they stand to lose
nothing; and therefore, the bondholders need not be made parties.
2. The City lost its lien for the tax involved by reason of the
fact that its treasurer, in compliance with a statutory request, for a
Certificate of "taxes due" furnished one which omitted said tax. Sec.
218, Chap. 142, 1935 C.S.A. (Sec. 7392, C. L. 1921), provides
that the certificate, with receipt showing payment of taxes, "shall be
conclusive evidence for all purposes and against all persons" that the
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tract "was at the time free and clear of all taxes."
Loss from any
error in such certificate and receipt shall be paid by the County.
3.
Although Denver is a home-rule City, all general statutes
of the State apply to it if not superseded by charter ordinance.
4. Section 34 of the City's Charter of March 29, 1904, provides
that the assessor shall provide in the assessment roll of taxes a column
wherein the treasurer may make memoranda of special assessments, etc.,
and that no error, failure, neglect or default on the part of the assessor
or treasurer in complying with the provisions of this section shall invalidate any tax or assessment or affect the lien thereof. This provision does not conflict with the statute for here is no provision for a
formal mandatory certificate for a special consideration, but something
different, a mere notation, unsigned and without consideration. EN
BANC.

Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice' Burke. Mr. Justice Bouck, Mr.
Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Holland, dissent.

TAXATION-VALUATION-CHARITABLE

ORGANIZATIONS-EXEMP-

TION-Hanagan et al. vs. Rocky Ford Knights of Pythias Building Association-No. 14102-Decided January 10, 1938-District Court of Otero County-Hon. William B. Stewart, JudgeReversed.
HELD:
1. Where the trial Court finds that a lodge is a charitable organization, and that a portion of the building used by it is
devoted to charitable purposes, the Supreme Court will not disturb
such finding unless there is no substantial evidence to support such a
finding.
2. Where a charitable organization owns a building, one floor
of which is rented to others for revenue producing purposes, and the
second floor is used, without charge, for its meetings, it is necessary for
the taxing authorities to make a fair and equitable separate valuation
and assessment of that part of the property used solely for revenue
producing purposes.
3.
Where the taxing authority assessed the lot upon which the
two story building stood for its full valuation and assessed the building as though it were a one story building, such assessment does not
provide for an equitable division of the real estate for taxation and
exemption purposes.
4.
The trial Court must determine the proportionate part of
the building subject to exemption, and the same proportion of the lot
is to be exempt. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.
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MANDAMUS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Hudson and Plummer vs. Annear, etc.-No. 14230-Decided January 10, 1938-District
Court of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
H was elected State Senator and P was elected State
Representative. While they served, the General Assembly enacted an
income tax law which provided that it was to be administered by the
State Treasurer who was given the power to employ such persons as
were necessary in the performance of the duties prescribed by the act
and to "delegate to any person so appointed, such power and authority as he deems reasonable and proper for the administration of this act."
H and P were appointed Division Chief Field Deputies under
the act. The State Auditor refused to issue warrants for salaries on
the ground that they were members of the General Assembly when the
law under which they were appointed was passed, and were such members when appointed and during the time for which they claimed compensation. This was alleged by the Auditor to be in violation of
Article III, and sections 6, 8 and 9 of Article V of the State Constitution.
HELD:
1. Although an "office" is an "employment," it does
not follow that every "employment" is an "office."
The positions to
which the men were appointed are not "civil offices" within the meaning of the Constitution. They were not required to take an official
oath, or to give bond, or to do other than to proceed with the discharge of duties assigned from time to time by the State Treasurer.
2. Where no inherent disqualification for preferment attends
the appointees, and others professing superior, legal rights thereto are
not complaining, the judicial department will not intrude into a situation which concerns only the other two departments (executive and
legislative), particularly where they are not in disagreement. EN
BANC.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.

Mr. Chief Justice Burke dis-

sents.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Police Protective Association of Colorado et

al vs. Warren et al.-Decided January 10, 1938-District Court
Weld County-Hon. Frederich W. Clark, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
Suit by taxpayer, for himself and other similarly situated, against the tax officials of Weld County to enjoin them from
levying a tax to augment the Policemen's Pension Fund under Chap-

ter 205, S. L. 1937.

The Police Protective Association of Denver

was made a party and, along with other such associations, gave evidence
tending to show that no small part of the duties of the Policemen was
outside of the corporate limits of the cities and towns. The trial Court
rendered judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the Act in question
providing for a .2 mill levy for the fund was unconstitutional as viola-
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tive of Sec. 7, Article X of the State Constitution. This provides that
the General Assembly shall not impose taxes for the purposes of any
County, City, Town or other Municipal Corporation, etc.
HELD: 1. Functions of Police Officers, from their nature and
the facts surrounding them may be either a state purpose or a municipal
purpose, and are subject to legislative control.
2. The work of Police Officers is not strictly for County benefit; it is for a purpose in which the entire state is concerned and from
which it will benefit.
3. The purpose of the Supreme Court is not to search for
reasons why a law should be held unconstitutional, but rather to accept it as constitutional, unless its repugnancy to the fundamental law
clearly appears.
4. "To the extent the police forces of the various cities and
towns serve a state purpose, which has been shown, the General Assembly could with propriety pass the Act of 1937, and not violate
said Section 7 of Article X of the State Constitution."
EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.

EQUITY-JUDGMENT-LACHES-EVIDENCE-Meyer et al us. Millihen et al.-No. 14155--Decided December 27, 1937-District
Court Denver-Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge-Reersed and
Remanded.
HELD:
1. Where the authorities tend to support, and the
Court finds merit in, both the cause of action and the defenses thereto,
equity requires that the substance of the controversy controls the
Court's consideration and decision rather than exactness and form.
2. A judgment must have a basis for its existence as a valid
judgment and a Court may not find that a claimant has validly assigned his claim and then enter judgment on the claim in his favor.
Such inconsistency causes the judgment to result in a mere nullity.
3. The Supreme Court will not approve a judgment of a Court
of another state based upon an alleged cause of action which by judicial ascertainment it is established had been sold and assigned by the
plaintiff to another for a valid consideration.
4. A Court of this state unquestionably has the power to en,
join the enforcement of a foreign judgment, palpably void upon its
face, between citizens of this state who are before the Court and in the
state.
5. Laches may not be presented as a valid defense where it appears that the plaintiff continually made inquiry concerning the retained money and no rights of innocent third parties intervened, and
where no circumstances legally required defendant to change its position to its prejudice.
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6.
Where the controlling features of a case are largely documentary, the Supreme Court is in as good a position to pass upon the
merits as was the trial Court and consequently the former is not bound
by the latter's findings.
7.
The Courts of this state will afford its citizens relief against
the enforcement of a void judgment and will not compel them to resort to a foreign tribunal. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Justice Bouck dissenting.

PARTNERSHIP - AGREEMENT OF SURVIVORSHIP - LOST INSTRUMENTS-EVIDENCE-TRUSTS-Walker et at. vs. DragmundNo. 13873-Decided December 27, 1937-District Court of
Lake County-Hon. William H. Luby, Judge-Affirmed in Part
and Reversed in Part.
FACTS:
Plaintiff and decedent were partners.
Plaintiff contended that there was a written Contract of Partnership containing a
covenant providing that upon the death of either partner, the interest
of the decedent should vest in the survivor and asked that the Court
appoint a Commissioner to convey the property to plaintiff and that
she be declared to be the sole owner as against heirs of decedent.
Trial
Court resolved all the issues in favor of plaintiff, except as to one piece
of property.
HELD:
1. Partners may enter into an agreement that, upon a
certain contingency, one of them shall succeed to all of the partnership
assets.

2. Where such an agreement is relied upon and is lost, the
secondary evidence proving the contents must be clear and satisfactory. While ordinarily it is not necessary that witnesses should be
able to tell the contents with absolute verbal accuracy, where specific
performance is sought, proof of the precise terms of the agreement is
indispensable. The evidence must be "strong and unequivocal."
3. Secondary evidence as to the contents of an instrument must
give its language, and a statement of the witness of his conclusion as
to its legal effect is not sufficient.
4. The right of a survivor is preferred above any devise or
testamentary conveyance which decedent can make, and any attempt
to devise property affected by survivorship is evidence inconsistent
with such status.
5.
Evidence considered and found to support a judgment that
a partnership existed, imposing a resulting trust in favor of the partnership upon the property designated by the trial Court and standing
in the name of the decedent at the time of his death, but the evidence
is not sufficient to prove survivorship.
EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bouck, Mr. Justice
Bakke and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.

